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SUMMARY
In this paper, a linear parameter varying (LPV) sliding mode sensor fault detection and isolation (FDI)
scheme is proposed wherein knowledge of the measurement redundancy is utilised to achieve FDI in
multiple channels simultaneously. Such a situation is common in some state-of-the-art aircraft fault
diagnosis systems where information is generally/mainly measured based on triplex redundancy. The
scheme proposed in this paper is based on an LPV sliding mode observer and exploits the so-called
equivalent output error injection signal to create estimates of the measurement faults. In the case of sensor
measurement redundancy, and where there exists a fault free (but unknown) sensor amongst the set of
measurements, the fault reconstruction performance of the observer can be improved by isolating and using
the output error injection signal associated with the fault free redundant sensor. Simulation results using the
RECONFIGURE benchmark model demonstrate the effectiveness of the scheme.
KEY WORDS: Integral sliding mode; Fault tolerant control; Control allocation
1. MOTIVATION
In recent years, LPV sliding mode observers have been developed to detect and isolate actuator or
sensor faults/failures over a large range of plant operation conditions [1, 2]. These observers contain
nonlinear injection terms driven by the output estimation errors and are quite different from the
Luenberger LPV observers which exist in the literature (e.g. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]).
Sliding mode observers typically create a residual signal which is robust against uncertainties so
that faults/failures can be reconstructed rather than just being detected. Furthermore the system
states can be robustly estimated despite the existence of faults if they can be expressed as matched
uncertainties with respect to the measurements. Usually, the thresholds used to declare faults are
chosen adaptively to satisfy the requirements of early detection, low missed detection rates and
false alarm rates, to further enhance the detection performance (e.g. in [14]). These advantages
have been demonstrated during the EU-FP7 ADDSAFE project [15]. However, one of the lessons
learnt from the ADDSAFE project relating to sensor FDI, is that because of the uncertainty, the
isolation logic required to determine the source of the faults from the three available sensors is
challenging and computationally intensive and contributes to more of the execution time than the
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2underlying observer design itself. This results in the schemes being considered as ‘expensive’ in
terms of computation time in the flight control computer [16].
In this paper, an LPV sliding mode observer based scheme is developed based on directly
exploiting sensor redundancy in the context of direct duplication making the scheme much simpler
and with lower computation complexity as compared to [15]. In ADDSAFE a sensor benchmark
problem was developed based on a triplex redundancy configuration and voting logic (as shown in
Fig. 1). Such measurement devices are commonly used in state-of-the-art fault diagnosis systems.
In this paper the observer scheme allows multiple simultaneous sensor measurement faults within
the triplex system to be detected and isolated. Compared with [15], the scheme proposed in this
paper does not require significant extra logic blocks to isolate the location of the faults because a
single observer is driven by all three (redundant and potentially faulty) sensor signals rather than
a single voted signal. Furthermore, the scheme proposed here has the capability of reconstructing
faults in multiple channels simultaneously, which cannot be done using the scheme in [15]. Despite
the fact that the observer proposed in this paper has a higher state-space order than the one in [15]
due to the redundant sensor measurements that are used to drive the observer, the final scheme has a
significantly lower computational load in terms of industrial implementation and therefore a faster
execution time. This is because extensive post-processing of the reconstruction signals in [15] is no
longer necessary. In contrast to [17], it is assumed the sensor providing the measurement for the
LPV scheduling parameters are healthy and provide accurate values [15]. (Indeed this assumption
is true in much of the LPV literature).
Figure 1. Airbus triplex redundancy configuration and the consolidation logic [18]
It is well known in the fault detection literature that if faults and uncertainties share the same
channel, traditional observer designs (without using sensor redundancy) cannot distinguish between
faults and uncertainties, and therefore ‘clean’ fault reconstruction signals are difficult to obtain.
In this study, we propose the equivalent error injection signal associated with fault free sensors
is utilised to reconstruct the uncertainty signal located in the fault free channel. The uncertainty
reconstruction signal is then employed to ‘cancel’ uncertainties appearing in the faulty channels
so that ‘clean’ fault reconstruction signals can be obtained. The problem set-up in this paper is
non-standard because the measured outputs are not independent from a system theory perspective.
3This requires some further initial theoretical development to rigorously understand this ‘unusual’
configuration, since at first glance, the theory in [1, 2] and hence [15] is not directly applicable.
This paper also attempts to bridge the gap between existing fault detection schemes and the
aerospace industry demands for sensor FDI. In current Airbus industrial practice, triplex redundant
air data sensor measurements are available and the fault detection logic (consolidation process)
requires at least two data channels to be fault-free. In the case wherein two or more than two sensors
fail simultaneously (and identically), the consolidation logic may become unreliable [19, 20, 21].
Instead of using the Airbus consolidation logic (in the work presented in [15], the sliding mode
observer is driven by one consolidated sensor output), the consolidation logic can be replaced by
the proposed scheme.
In this paper, a case study based on Airbus’s RECONFIGURE benchmark is used to demonstrate
the efficacy of the proposed scheme. In this study, two of the three angle of attack sensors are
assumed to be simultaneously corrupted by various sensor faults. The simulation results show that
not only can two faults be straightforwardly detected and isolated, but also the fault reconstruction
performance can be improved for a large set of flight conditions. The contribution claimed here is
not in terms of the development of the sliding mode observer per se, but its application within a
novel problem formulation.
The paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 the new problem formulation is proposed for a
generic LPV representation with redundant (identical) measurements; whilst Section 3 discusses the
isolation logic associated with the proposed scheme. In Section 4, the decision making logic, used
to improve the fault reconstruction performance in the presence of a fault free redundant sensor, is
introduced. A case study based on the RECONFIGURE benchmark model is described in Section
5. Finally, Section 6 makes some concluding remarks and offers directions for future work.
2. LPV SLIDING MODE OBSERVER
Consider an LPV model of the plant represented by
x˙p(t) = Ap(ρ)xp(t) +Bp(ρ)u(t) +Mp(ρ)ζ(t)
yp(t) = Cpxp(t) +Npf(t)
(1)
where, Ap(ρ) ∈ Rn×n, Bp(ρ) ∈ Rn×m, Cp ∈ Rp×n and Np ∈ Rp×q , where q < p and Np represents
the sensor fault distribution matrix. The time varying matrix Mp(ρ) ∈ Rn×d represents the
uncertainty distribution matrix. The vector ρ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rh denotes the set of nominal scheduling
parameters belonging to a polytope Θ. In (1) it is assumed that yp(t) and u(t) are measurable but
xp(t) is unknown. The signal f(t) represents faults, which are unknown, and are to be estimated.
The signal ζ(t) represents the uncertainty which is assumed to be bounded by ‖ζ(t)‖ ≤ β. The
scheduling parameter ρ is assumed to be measured accurately (in contrast to [17]).
In this paper, all parameter varying matrices are assumed to depend affinely on ρ, in particular
Ap(ρ) = Ap,0 + ρ1Ap,1 + . . .+ ρhAp,h (2)
where, the scalar ρi represents the ith component of ρ.
4Assumption 1
In the system in (1):
• the columns of Np are taken from the standard basis for Rp;
• rank(Cp) < p, i.e. there exits redundancy within the measurements, and furthermore the
matrix Cp has several identical rows corresponding to repeated identical sensors measuring
the same quantity of interest.
Remark 1
As a consequence of Assumption 1, this paper is quite distinct from [1, 2] and [15] (and indeed
all of the previous work of the authors) and requires some (preliminary) careful development to
account for the rank deficiency in Cp. In the authors’ earlier work, for example in [1, 2] and
[15], several different observers were designed and run in parallel to account for the duplication
of measurements. In this way the output distribution matrices in [1, 2] are of full (row) rank. The
approach proposed here is quite different and the implicit rank deficiency is handled differently.
2.1. Observer structure with the rank deficiency in Cp
Because of the rank deficiency associated with Cp this subsection develops a bespoke framework
because sliding cannot be sustained on the surface associated with the output estimation error being
maintained at zero.
Exploiting the structure of Np, and by permutating the system outputs, it is easy to obtain the
output representation [
yp,1(t)
yp,2(t)
]
=
[
Cp,1
Cp,2
]
xp(t) +
[
0
Iq
]
f(t) (3)
where Cp,1 ∈ R(p−q)×n and Cp,2 ∈ Rq×n, and yp,2(t) denotes the measurements potentially
corrupted by sensor faults.
Assumption 2
It will be assumed that yp,2 comprises multiple measurements of the same quantities by distinct
identical sensors.
Remark 2
From Assumption 2, Cp,2 is rank 1 and formed from q identical rows. This will be exploited in all
the analysis which follows. Such a situation occurs in many systems (such as aircraft) where critical
information is measured by triplex redundant sensor systems [22], which here would correspond to
q = 3. The ideas of [1, 2] and [15] cannot be directly applied to the formulation in (1)–(3). This
paper addresses and exploits this rank deficiency property in a bespoke way. A specific formulation
is proposed to handle this situation, and this represents the main contribution of the paper.
Suppose rank(Cp,1) = r ≤ p− q. As a consequence the matrix Cp,1 can be written as Cp,1 = QR
where Q ∈ R(p−q)×(p−q) is a nonsingular square matrix and R ∈ R(p−q)×n has following structure
R =
[
0
R1
]
(4)
5where R1 ∈ Rr×n. Let y˜p,1 = Q−1yp,1, then y˜p,1 = Rxp. Define a new state component zf(t) ∈ Rq
according to
z˙f (t) = −Afzf (t) +Afyp,2(t) (5)
where Af = afIq and af is a positive design scalar. From (1), (3) and (5), an augmented system can
be created of the form[
x˙p(t)
z˙f (t)
]
=
[
Ap(ρ) 0
AfCp,2 −Af
][
xp(t)
zf(t)
]
+
[
Bp(ρ)
0
]
u(t) +
[
0
Af
]
f(t) +
[
Mp(ρ)
0
]
ζ(t)
[
y˜p,1(t)
zf (t)
]
=
[
R 0
0 Iq
][
xp(t)
zf (t)
] (6)
Define a coordinate transformation matrix for (6) by
Ta = Diag{Ts, Iq} (7)
where Ts ∈ Rn×n is any nonsingular matrix such that R1T−1s =
[
0 Ir
]
. Let AfCp,2T−1s =[
A31 A32
]
. Because Af = afIq where af is a scalar, the matrix sub-block A31 is formed from
repeated rows; i.e. it has the from 1q ⊗A311 where 1q ∈ Rq is a vector of ones, and A311 is a row
vector with n− r elements. Then applying the coordinate transformation xp → x where x = Taxp
to (6), yields
⎡
⎢⎣x˙1(t)x˙2(t)
z˙f (t)
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
x˙a(t)
=
⎡
⎢⎣A11(ρ) A12(ρ) 0A21(ρ) A22(ρ) 0
A31 A32 −Af
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(ρ)
⎡
⎢⎣x1(t)x2(t)
zf (t)
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
xa(t)
+
[
TsBp(ρ)
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(ρ)
u(t)+
[
0
Af
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
f(t)+
[
TsMp(ρ)
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M(ρ)
ζ(t)
ya(t) = Cxa(t)
(8)
where x1 ∈ Rn−r, x2 ∈ Rr and
C =
[
0 Ir 0
0 0 Iq
]
(9)
Remark 3
Note the form in (8) is bespoke to this paper and arises from the very specific problem formulation
considered here. In particular a very specific manipulation of the ordering of the ordering of the
measurements has been made to create ya from yp.
Remark 4
The system in (8)–(9) is now in the form
x˙a(t) = A(ρ)xa(t) +B(ρ)u(t) +Df(t) +M(ρ)ζ(t)
ya(t) = Cxa(t)
(10)
which has a more conventional unknown input observer (UIO) formulation (i.e. C is full row rank
and CD has full column rank). This has been achieved by the specific creation of ya ∈ Rr+q from
6the measured output y ∈ Rp. The sliding mode observer for (10) is therefore essentially similar to
the one from [1, 2]. Some details are repeated here because specific assumptions need to be exploited
and some subtle differences are present.
Assumption 3
In this paper, it is assumed that (A11(ρ), A21(ρ)) defined in (8) is detectable.
Remark 5
A sufficient condition to guarantee the observability/detectability for (A11(ρ), A21(ρ)) can be found
in [23].
The proposed sliding mode observer has the structure
⎡
⎢⎣
˙ˆx1(t)
˙ˆx2(t)
˙ˆzf(t)
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z˙(t)
=
⎡
⎢⎣A11(ρ) A12(ρ) 0A21(ρ) A22(ρ) 0
A31 A32 −Af
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(ρ)
⎡
⎢⎣ xˆ1(t)xˆ2(t)
zˆf (t)
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
z(t)
+
[
TsBp(ρ)
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(ρ)
u(t)+Gl(ρ)ey(t)+Gnν(t)
yˆ = Cz
(11)
where the output estimation error ey(t) = C(xa(t)− z(t)) and the output error injection is given by
ν =
⎧⎨
⎩
k(t)
ey
‖ey‖ if ey 	= 0
0 otherwise
(12)
where k(t) is a positive scalar. In (11), ρ(t) ∈ Θˆ ⊂ Rh and denotes the scheduling parameters of the
SMO, where Θˆ is a compact set. As in [2], the matrix Gn ∈ R(n+q)×(q+r) in (11) is given by
Gn =
[
−L
Ir+q
]
(13)
where the design matrix L ∈ R(n−r)×(p+r) has the structure
L =
[
L1 0
]
(14)
and the matrix L1 ∈ R(n−r)×r. Note the dimensions of Gl(ρ) and Gn are bespoke to this paper and
are quite different to the generic case in [2], [15]. Here because of the redundancy and hence the
rank deficiency in Cp, the sliding motion is no longer order n.
In the sequel partition M(ρ) as
M(ρ) =
[
M1(ρ)
M2(ρ)
]
(15)
where M1(ρ) ∈ R(n−r)×d and
M2(ρ) =
[
M21(ρ)
0
]
∈ R(r+q)×d (16)
7where M21(ρ) ∈ Rr×d. This specific structure of uncertainty will be exploited later in the paper.
Define e = xa − z and let e = col(e1, e2, ezf ) where e1 ∈ Rn−r, e2 ∈ Rr and ezf ∈ Rq . Then
subtracting (8) from (11) yields
⎡
⎢⎣ e˙1e˙2
e˙zf
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎣ A11(ρ) A12(ρ) 0A21(ρ) A22(ρ) 0
A31 A32 −Af
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ e1e2
ezf
⎤
⎥⎦+
[
0
D2
]
f −
[
Gl1(ρ)
Gl2(ρ)
]
ey −
[
−L
Ir+q
]
ν +
[
M1(ρ)
M2(ρ)
]
ζ
(17)
where the gain Gl(ρ) has been appropriately partitioned, and the matrix D2 ∈ R(r+q)×q is given by
D2 =
[
0
Af
]
(18)
Define a coordinate transformation e → TLe = e˜, given by
TL =
[
In−r L
0 Ir+q
]
(19)
Applying the above transformation to (17) and using the fact thatLD2 = 0 (because of the structures
of L from (14) and D2 from (18)) generates a new error coordinate system⎡
⎢⎣
˙˜e1
˙˜e2
˙˜ezf
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
˙˜e
=
⎡
⎢⎣ A˜11(ρ) A˜12(ρ) 0A21(ρ) A˜22(ρ) 0
A31 A˜32 −Af
⎤
⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎣ e˜1e˜2
e˜zf
⎤
⎥⎦
︸ ︷︷ ︸
e˜
+
[
0
D2
]
f −
[
G˜l1(ρ)
Gl2(ρ)
]
ey −
[
0
Ir+q
]
ν +
[
M˜1(ρ)
M2(ρ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M˜(ρ)
ζ
(20)
where e˜1 = e1 + L1e2 and G˜l1(ρ) = Gl1(ρ) + LGl2(ρ). As a result of the change of coordinates in
(20)
A˜11(ρ) = A11(ρ) + L1A21(ρ)
A˜22(ρ) = A22(ρ)−A21(ρ)L1
A˜32 = A32 −A31L1
M˜1(ρ) = M1(ρ) + L1M21(ρ)
(21)
Exploiting Assumption 3, the matrix design freedom L is selected to ensure A˜11(ρ) is quadratically
stable, i.e. there exists a symmetric positive definite matrix P1 such that
P1A˜11(ρ) + A˜11(ρ)
TP1 < 0 (22)
Note that despite this change of coordinates the matrix A31 remains unaffected (and comprises q
identical rows whose elements are the row vector A311).
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A˜21(ρ) =
[
A21(ρ)
A31
]
(23)
where A31 ∈ Rq×(n−r) and does not depend on the scheduling parameter. This follows because the
lower left sub-block of A(ρ) in (11) is independent of the scheduling parameter. This property is
preserved despite the sequence of transformations used to establish (20). This structure is exploited
in the sequel.
In the error system coordinates in (20) define
[
G˜l1(ρ)
Gl2(ρ)
]
=
⎡
⎢⎣ A˜12(ρ) 0A˜22(ρ) + k2Ir 0
A˜32 −Af + k2Iq
⎤
⎥⎦ (24)
where k2 is a positive design scalar. The following result pertains to the existence of a sliding motion
and establishes conditions on the modulation gain k(t) in (12).
Define a sliding surface in the state estimation error space as
S = {e˜ ∈ Rn+q : Ce˜ = 0} (25)
where C is defined in (9).
Theorem 1
Provided the modulation gain k is suitably larger than the fault, a sliding motion on S can be
enforced in finite time.
Proof
Substituting (24) into (20) yields
˙˜e = A˜e(ρ)e˜+
[
0
D2
]
f + M˜(ρ)ζ −
[
0
Ir+q
]
ν (26)
where
A˜e(ρ) =
[
A˜11(ρ) 0
A˜21(ρ) −k2Ir+q
]
and M˜(ρ) =
[
M˜1(ρ)
M2(ρ)
]
(27)
Let P1 ∈ R(n−r)×(n−r) be a symmetric strictly positive definite matrix such that (22) holds. Then
for a sufficiently large positive gain k2, the symmetric positive definite matrix P = diag(P1, Ir+q)
has the property that
PA˜e(ρ) + A˜e(ρ)
TP < 0 (28)
For details see for example [24]. Note that (22) and (28) can be evaluated and tested at all vertices
of the polytope. Exploiting the fact that the signals f and ζ are bounded, and by construction
e˜TP
[
0
Ir+q
]
ν = k(t)‖ey‖ (29)
9it follows using the Lyapunov function V (e˜) = e˜TP e˜T that if k > ‖f‖, V˙ ≤ PA˜e(ρ) + A˜e(ρ)TP +
2e˜TM˜(ρ)ζ. Since ‖ζ‖ is bounded, it follows that e˜(t) in (26) is ultimately bounded and so e˜1(t) is
also ultimately bounded. Suppose for t > t0, ‖e˜(t)‖ < χ and define
a21 = max
ρ∈Θ
‖A˜21(ρ)‖, m2 = max
ρ∈Θ
‖M2(ρ)‖ (30)
Then choosing
k = a21χ+ k2‖ey‖+ ‖D2‖‖f‖+m2β + η (31)
where β is the bound on the uncertainty ζ(t) and η is a positive scalar, it follows that
eTy e˙y = e
T
y (A˜21(ρ)e˜1 − k2ey +D2f +M2(ρ)ζ − ν)
≤ ‖ey‖(a21χ+ k2‖ey‖+ ‖D2‖‖f‖+m2β − k)
≤ −η‖ey‖
(32)
This ensures sliding takes place on S in finite time and can be maintained on S in the face of faults
[25].
Remark 6
Note that Theorem 1 demonstrates that the detectability of (A11(ρ), A21(ρ)) implies detectability of
(A(ρ), C) as a consequence of (28).
2.2. Fault reconstruction
During sliding on S, ˙˜e2(t) = e˜2(t) = 0 and ˙˜ezf(t) = e˜zf(t) = 0. Let
νeq =
[
νeq,1
νeq,2
]
(33)
where νeq is the equivalent output error injection signal necessary to maintain sliding and νeq,1 ∈ Rr
and νeq,2 ∈ Rq.
During sliding, (20) can be rewritten as
˙˜e1 = A˜11(ρ)e˜1 + M˜1(ρ)ζ (34)
0 = A21(ρ)e˜1 − νeq,1 +M21(ρ)ζ (35)
0 = A31e˜1 +Aff − νeq,2 (36)
Equation (34) governs the dynamics of the sliding motion. The absence of uncertainty in (36)
follows from the structure of M2(ρ) in (16). In order to reduce the effect of the unmatched
uncertainty ζ on e˜1, whilst ensuring stability of the reduced order sliding motion, L1 is selected
to minimise the L2 norm γ associated with the LPV system H(ρ) : ζ → ξ given by
H(ρ) :
{
˙˜e1 = A˜11(ρ)e˜1 + M˜1(ρ)ζ
ξ = A31e˜1
(37)
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Using the vertex property and the Bounded Real Lemma, L1 can be calculated by solving a finite
number of linear matrix inequalities (see for example [26, 27, 3]), specifically:
Theorem 2
An upper bound on the L2 gain γ for the LPV system H(ρ) can be computed so that
‖ξ‖L2 ≤ γ‖ζ‖L2 (38)
if there exists a s.p.d matrix P0 and design freedom L1 such that⎡
⎢⎣ P0A˜11(ρ) + A˜11(ρ)
TP0 P0M˜1(ρ) A
T
31
∗ −γI 0
∗ ∗ −γI
⎤
⎥⎦ < 0 (39)
Proof
From the Bounded Real Lemma, (38) is guaranteed if (39) holds. Using the vertex property
discussed in [26], the representation in (39) can be converted into polytopic form and the synthesis
of L and the analysis of (39) is undertaken only at the vertices of the polytope. Writing Y = P0L it
follows (39) is affine with respect to the decision variables P0 and Y .
Corrolary 1. In the absence of uncertainty i.e. when ξ = 0 then e˜1 → 0 as t → ∞ and
fˆ = A−1f νeq,2 (40)
is an asymptotic estimate of the fault.
Proof
In the absence of uncertainty, (34) reduces to ˙˜e1 = A˜11(ρ)e˜1 and e˜1 → 0 as t → ∞ as claimed. Since
e˜1 → 0 as t → ∞, it follows from (36) that νeq,2 → Aff as t → ∞.
In the presence of uncertainty, if the fault reconstruction fˆ is chosen as in (40), however it is clear
from (36) that the fault reconstruction signals fˆ will be affected by the unmatched uncertainty since
e˜1 is driven by the uncertainty ζ.
3. ISOLATION LOGIC
In this section, fault isolation logic is discussed in the presence of uncertainty according to two fault
scenarios.
3.1. All redundant sensors are faulty
In this situation, the ith fault reconstruction signal fˆi for i = 1, . . . , q, calculated using (40), reflects
information about both the faults and the unmatched uncertainty in the ith channel. The signal fˆi
can still be used directly for FDI purposes provided the unmatched uncertainty is small enough
compared with the fault in the ith channel (This is effectively the problem considered in the earlier
work [2]).
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3.2. One redundant sensor is fault free
Without loss of generality, assume the qth redundant sensor is fault-free and the remaining q − 1
redundant sensors are assumed to be faulty.
As defined in (5), the diagonal elements in Af are denoted by af and let the equivalent output error
injection associated with the ith channel be νeq2,i. Then using (40), the ith fault reconstruction signal
is given by
fˆi = a
−1
f νeq2,i ∀i = 1, . . . , q (41)
The equivalent error injection signals associated with the faulty channels are given by
νeq2,i = A311e˜1 + affi ∀i = 1, . . . , q − 1 (42)
where A311 represents one of the repeated row vectors in A31 and fi denotes the actual fault
occurring in the ith channel. Substituting (42) into (41) yields
fˆi = a
−1
f A311e˜1 + fi ∀i = 1, . . . , q − 1 (43)
Obviously, the fault reconstruction performance is degraded due to the term a−1f A311e˜1. Now
considering that the qth redundant sensor is fault free, i.e. fq = 0, it follows from (36) that
veq2,q = A311e˜1 (44)
Substituting (44) into (40) yields fˆq = a−1f A311e˜1 and reconstructs the uncertainty in (43). Using
(43), a ‘clean’ fault reconstruction signal f˜i is given by
f˜i = fˆi − fˆq = fi for all i = 1, . . . , q − 1 (45)
Remark 7
It is clear from (45) that the unmatched uncertainty term a−1f A311e˜1 can be cancelled in all faulty
channels if fault free sensor redundancy is available. Then the ‘clean’ fault reconstruction signals f˜i
will be used for FDI purposes. It is therefore crucial to be able to identify fault free injection signals.
This will be discussed in the next section.
4. FAULT RECONSTRUCTION DECISION MAKING LOGIC
This section discusses the decision making logic used to create the claimed improved fault
reconstruction performance in the presence of a fault free redundant sensor.
Without loss of generality, assume the qth redundant sensor is fault free, in which case it can
be assumed that the magnitude of fˆq is smaller than fˆi, i = 1, . . . , q − 1. Then ‘clean’ fault
reconstruction signals f˜i, i = 1, . . . , q − 1 are calculated using (45).
Further, partition yp,2 as
yp,2 =
[
yp2,1, . . . , yp2,q
]T
(46)
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and let
y˜p,2 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
y˜p2,1
.
.
.
y˜p2,q−1
y˜p2,q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
yp2,1 − f˜i
.
.
.
yp2,q−1 − f˜q−1
yp2,q
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (47)
where yp2,q represents the qth redundant sensor output which is fault free. If
y˜p2,1 ≈ y˜p2,2 ≈ . . . ≈ y˜p2,q (48)
then it is confirmed that a) the fault free measurement has been correctly identified b) that the
reconstruction signals f˜i for i = 1, . . . , q − 1 denotes an improved fault estimation compared with
fˆi for i = 1, . . . , q − 1.
5. RECONFIGURE BENCHMARK CASE STUDY
The RECONFIGURE benchmark is a nonlinear highly representative model of a generic Airbus
civil commercial aircraft [16, 28]. The benchmark contains a baseline gain-scheduled controller,
detailed actuator and sensor models, as well as angle of attack and speed protection components
and measurement filters. This aircraft model, which has been developed within the EU funded
RECONFIGURE project, is used as the basis for all the scenarios and for testing different fault
detection and fault tolerant control strategies. Simplified LPV models are also available for the
design of FDI and fault tolerant control schemes [16, 28].
An LPV model of the benchmark has been established using polynomial interpolation of multiple
longitudinal linear time invariant models linearized under cruise conditions. The chosen scheduling
parameters are
ρ =
[
w(tons) cg(%) Vc(kt) Ma
]
(49)
which represent the aircraft weight, the centre of gravity position, calibrated airspeed and Mach
number. The scheduling parameters have been normalized in the interval
[
0 1
]
. All parameter-
varying matrices are assumed to depend affinely on ρ, in particular A(ρ) = A0 +
∑4
i=1 ρiAi. In this
paper, due to the existence of aggressive pitch stick excitations, significant plant-model mismatch
exists. The plant-model mismatch will be dealt with by ensuring the occurrence of a sliding mode
[29] and fully utilising the sensor redundancy. This is another advantage of the proposed scheme.
The state variables are
xp =
[
q p Vg α θ Zg
]T
(50)
representing pitch rate, roll rate, ground speed, angle of attack, pitch and altitude respectively.
Table I. Flight points on the edge of the flight envelope
Flight Points Gross weight (t) CG(%) VCAS (kt) Zg(ft) S/F conf Landing gear Phase
A MFW Max forward CG VLS-5 Ceiling 0 Up 2
B MFW Medium CG VFE 1000 4 Down 2
C (MTOW+MLW)/2 Max aft CG VLS-5 Ceiling 0 Up 2
D MTOW Max aft CG VFE 1000 4 Down 2
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Suppose the system outputs are only partially measurable. Crucially, the variable Vg is also treated
as ‘unreliable’ due to the potential loss of calibrated airspeed Vc. For the purpose of achieving the
‘output canonical form’, the output variables are reordered as
yp =
[
q θ Zg α1 α2 α3
]T
(51)
where α1, α2 and α3 represent angle of attack measured by three individual air data sensors (before
the consolidation logic in the air data inertial reference system ADIRS) each of which are assumed
to be potentially corrupted by sensor faults. The system input vector is up =
[
δe δstab
]T
where
δe denotes an aggregation of the control deflections of the elevators (which are assumed to move in
tandem) and δstab represents the stabilizer deflection.
The proposed scheme will be evaluated at four edges of the flight envelope, which are listed in
Table II (see bottom of the page) wherein ‘MFW’, ‘MLW’ and ‘MTOW’ denote the maximum flight
weight, the maximum landing weight and the maximum take-off weight, respectively, and ‘VLS’
and ‘VFE’ represent the minimum selectable speed and the maximum speed slat/flap extended,
respectively. The numerical values with respect to the various weights and speeds are not given in
this paper due to industrial restrictions.
The pitch stick excitation associated with the four flight conditions are shown in Fig. 2. In the
example, 3deg and 5deg sensor biases (faults) are assumed to occur on α1 and α2, respectively
(i.e. the first two measurements of angle of attack). The third redundant sensor associated with
α3 is assumed to be fault free. Furthermore, the fault signals f1 and f2 are assumed to occur
simultaneously at 5sec. To facilitate the industrial evaluation of the computational load of the
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Figure 2. Pitching stick excitation
design, the FDD scheme proposed in this paper has been re-coded purely based on the Airbus
state of practice for Flight Control Computer (FCC) software coding – the SAO (Airbus software,
Computer-Assisted Specification) library [18]. This contains a set of graphical functional blocks
(in the manner of SIMULINK blocks), allowing only a limited set of mathematical operations. For
each SAO block, a specific computational load is defined. Through classifying and counting the
SAO blocks used the FDD scheme, the associated computational load is calculated.
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Due to industrial limitations, the numerical ‘SAO’ coding results are not provided
straightforwardly. As in (52), the ‘scaled’ computational load is treated as a criteria to measure
Airbus’s ‘industrial complexity’. Specifically
ETs =
ET
ETmax
(52)
where ETs represents the ‘scaled’ computational load which is defined as a ratio between the actual
computational load ET and the maximum allowable computational load ETmax predefined by
Airbus.
Table II shows the scaled ‘SAO’ coding results associated with the FDI scheme in this paper and
the one used in [15]. Clearly, the proposed FDI scheme has much lower SAO computational burden.
Table II. Comparison of the scaled industrial computational load
Proposed FDI scheme FDI scheme in [15]
ETs 0.376208 2.317008
5.1. Design results
In this example, n = 6; p = 6, q = 3 and
Cp=
[
Cp,1
Cp,2
]
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Np=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
By choosing a suitable gain matrix for L1 in (13) and (14), the matrix A˜11(ρ) is established. In this
design, k = 3, As22 = I3 and the value of L has been obtained using the Matlab LMI toolbox as
L =
⎡
⎢⎣ 0.0034 0 0.5334 0 0 00.0000 0 0.0028 0 0 0
0.0070 0 1.5471 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎦ (53)
The filter parameter Af = I3, the scalar  is 13, and the small positive scalar selected for the
sigmoidal approximation [25] to the discontinuous injection term is 0.01.
5.2. Simulation results
During the simulation, the auto-trust is engaged during the whole simulation. Since unexpected
closed-loop behaviour will occur under some flight conditions due to the existence of
uncompensated sensor bias, the fault reconstruction performance will be degraded and ‘perfect’
fault reconstruction is difficult to achieve. The behaviours of the aircraft states are not shown here
due to industrial restrictions.
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The sliding surfaces ‖ey‖ associated with the four flight conditions are shown in Fig. 3. Despite
some flight conditions being on the edge of the flight envelope, ‖ey‖ is close to zero and sliding is
maintained.
The comparisons between the actual sensor bias acting on α1 and α2, the fault reconstruction
signals and the clean fault reconstruction signals, associated with four flight conditions, are shown in
Figs. 4-7. In Figs. 4-7, the red lines represents the actual sensor bias. The blue and green lines depict
the fault reconstruction signals (i.e. fˆ1 and fˆ2) and the ‘clean’ fault reconstruction signals f˜1 and
f˜2 (as defined in Section 3), respectively. It is clear from Figs. 4-7 that all the fault reconstruction
signals approximate the correct magnitudes of the two sensor biases (despite being tested over a
wide set of flight conditions and in the presence of unexpected closed-loop behaviour caused by
the uncompensated sensor biases being fed to the controller), and therefore fault isolation can be
achieved. Furthermore, the fault reconstruction performance is improved by using the redundant
fault free sensor to create ‘clean’ fault estimates f˜i. These ‘clean’ estimates f˜i are always better
than their original counterparts fˆi.
The fault reconstruction performance is judged using the decision making logic provided in
Section 4. Absolute values of errors between y˜p2,1, y˜p2,2 and y˜p2,3 are shown in Fig. 8. It is clear from
Fig. 8 that the fault reconstruction performance is good despite the wide range of flight conditions.
Spikes at 5sec are caused by the occurrence of the sensor bias.
6. CONCLUSION
This study has proposed a sliding mode sensor FDI scheme wherein the triplex sensor redundancy
is utilised to achieve FDI directly, so that minimal additional logic and post-processing is required
to isolate the location of the faults. To achieve this, a slightly nonstandard sliding mode observer
formulation has been introduced account for the fact that not all of the measurements, in a system
theory sense, are independent. Because of this special formulation, and the absence of any extensive
post-processing, the computational burden of the proposed observer scheme is greatly reduced
compared to earlier work. To achieve this, the equivalent output error injection signal associated
with the fault free redundant sensor can be used to improve the fault reconstruction performance.
The fault isolation logic and decision making logic used to create the fault reconstructions are also
discussed. The proposed scheme is has been applied to the RECONFIGURE benchmark model to
simultaneously detect and isolate two types of sensor bias which act simultaneously on two angle
of attack sensor measurements. Good fault reconstruction results demonstrate the efficacy of the
proposed scheme.
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Figure 4. Flight point A
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Figure 5. Flight point B
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Figure 6. Flight point C
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Figure 7. Flight point D
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Figure 8. Decision marking
